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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how different levels of domestic 
trade affect the intensity of conflict within and between 
states. Specifically, the thesis utilizes a cross-sectional 
analysis of pooled time-series data, both previously 
collected conflict data sets and published economic data, 
to test the hypothesis.  The data is analyzed by conducting 
a correlation analysis followed by linear regression of the 
independent and dependent variables, controlling for 
certain variances between the cases by utilizing control 
variables.  The findings reveal that high levels of 
domestic trade decrease a state’s propensity to initiate an 
inter-state dispute or to fall into civil war.  The policy 
implications of the findings are that advancing domestic 
trade will have the greatest statistical effect on 
decreasing a state’s propensity to initiate an inter-state 
dispute or fall into civil war. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis will examine how different levels of 
domestic trade affect the intensity of conflict within and 
between states.  Specifically, the thesis will try to 
answer the question of whether domestic trade is correlated 
to conflict, both international and domestic.  Democratic 
peace and the international trade theory is accepted by 
many scholars, and much has been written examining the 
relationship between the levels of international trade and 
in particular, bilateral trade, and militarized inter-state 
conflict. This thesis will expand our knowledge of inter- 
and intra-state conflict by focusing on domestic trade, a 
factor that has heretofore not been thoroughly examined.  
Lastly, the analysis of the data in this thesis will be 
used to develop a general domestic trade theory that will 
form the basis for a series of policy recommendations. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Much of foreign policy of the United State is based on 
the theory that the integration of economies into the 
global community will increase the level of interdependence 
that will, in turn, lower the level of global militarized 
intra-state disputes and inter-state war, and that this 
will create a secure global environment for the United 
States and its allies.1  Much literature has been written on 
the effects of trade on conflict, and even the 
                     
1 Office of the President of the United States, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2006), 25-30 and 47-9. 
 2
democratizing effects of trade,2 but in the case of states 
where democracy is expected to grow or at least where they 
are expected to become open economies that participate in 
free and fair trade, it is important to examine the role of 
domestic trade.3  Since the majority of the literature 
addresses either the trade-conflict debate or the 
relationship between civil war and international trade, 
this thesis will broaden our inquiry by examining the 
relationship between domestic trade and conflict, both 
international and internal.  The point of departure for 
this analysis is the theory that domestic trade causes 
economic development within a state, which helps to 
increase political stability.4  Building on these theories, 
we will assume that the pacifying benefits of economic 
development are not limited to internal disputes and that 
improved domestic trade can reduce the number and intensity 
of militarized conflicts within and between states.  
                     
2 See: John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Moaz and Bruce Russett, 
"The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International 
Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1996), John R. 
Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Test of the Democratic Peace: Controlling 
for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85," Political Research Quarterly 
50, no. 4 (December 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The 
Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 
1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace 
with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," Journal 
of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 1999), and Bruce Russett, John R. 
Oneal and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for 
Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85," 
International Organization 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998). 
3 Office of the President of the United States, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2006), 25-6. 
4 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political 
Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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The policy implications of this research are obvious. 
If the hypothesis of this thesis is validated and it is 
found that there is indeed a negative correlation between 
domestic trade and conflict, it will show that improving 
domestic trade within a target state increases the 
probability of strengthening international and domestic 
peace. 
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis will attempt to advance our knowledge of 
the relationship between trade and conflict.  A 
considerable portion of the research concerning the trade-
conflict debate addresses trade or economic interdependence 
at the international level, principally examining how 
levels of international trade or interdependence correlate 
with conflict.  The previous research has produced a 
diversity of definitions on conflict that include war, 
conflict intensity levels, democratic peace, and 
Militarized Inter-State Disputes (MIDs). This thesis will 
continue this trend and utilize conflict intensity levels  
 4
in its analysis.5   There have also been an equal number of 
inconclusive results or contradicting results between the 
two prominent camps of the trade-conflict debate: the 
realist camp,6 which argues that trade increases conflict 
and the liberal camp,7 which points out that there is indeed 
a negative correlation between the variables.8  This thesis 
will continue the spirit of this research but will take a 
new and different approach in its examination of the trade-
                     
5 For more see Bruce Russett, International Regions and the 
International System. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967) and Peter 
Wallensteen, Structure and War: On International Relations 1920-1968. 
(Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1973).  On conflict intensity levels see: 
Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade." The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 24, no. 1 (March 1980), Solomon W. Polachek and Judith 
McDonald. "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation." In 
Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas 
Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey, 273-284. (New York: Praeger, 1992), 
Solomon W. Polachek, "Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: 
The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation." Review 
of International Economics 5, no. 3 (1997), Mark Gasiorowski and 
Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and 
Linkages in the Era of Detente." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, 
no. 4 (December 1982), and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National 
Evidence." International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (March 1986): 23-
38. For MIDSs see: John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett. "Assessing the 
Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces 
Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 1999), John R. 
Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Test of the Democratic Peace: Controlling 
for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85." Political Research Quarterly 
50, no. 4 (December 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett. "The 
Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
Conflict, 1950-1985." International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 
1997), John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Moaz and Bruce Russett. 
"The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International 
Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1996), and 
Katherine Barbieri, "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on 
Trade," Journal of Political Research 36, no. 4 (1999). 
6 See: Russett (1967), Wallensteen (1973), and Barbieri (1999). 
7 See: Polachek (1980, 1992, 1997) Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982), 
Gasiorowski (1986), Oneal et al. (1996), Oneal and Ray (1997), and 
Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999). 
8 Gasiorowski (1986) and Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) achieved mixed results. 
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conflict correlation by selecting a completely different 
independent variable – domestic trade.  For our analysis, 
the thesis hypothesis is that domestic trade and conflict 
is negatively correlated and leads to the following 
propositions that will be addressed in the research. 
 
Propositions 
(P.1) High levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to initiate inter-state conflict. 
(P.2) High levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
1. Chapter II (Literature Review) 
Chapter II will evaluate the relevant literature on 
interdependence, international trade and conflict, and 
civil war.  In addition, the literature review will 
introduce theories and research methodologies that were 
utilized in this thesis to construct the research design. 
2. Chapter III (Research Design and Methodology) 
This chapter will describe the research design and 
methodology that was used in testing the hypothesis and 
supporting propositions.  Moreover, the model for measuring 
and testing the correlation between trade and conflict will 
be presented along with the methodology for the 
operalization of the variables. 
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3. Chapter IV (Testing and Analysis) 
Chapter IV will introduce the testing, the results of 
testing, and the analysis of how these are related to the 
aforementioned propositions and research question.  
4. Chapter V (Conclusion) 
Chapter V will review and sum up the results of the 
testing for each of the propositions.  Additionally, the 
chapter will address the policy implications of the study 
and areas for future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. INTRODUCTION 
A large body of political science, international 
relations, economic, and anthropological literature is 
pertinent to the study of domestic trade and its 
correlation to militarized inter-state disputes and civil 
war — the focal point of this thesis.  The objective of the 
literature review presented in this chapter is to 
synthesize and summarize the pertinent and relevant 
literature pertaining to two critical research areas: the 
impact of trade on international conflict and the impact of 
domestic trade on civil war.  This literature review will 
serve as an effective point of departure, which will 
address past theoretical and empirical works and provide an 
intellectual foundation for the rest of the thesis. 
B. TRADE INCREASES CONFLICT (REALIST VIEW) 
One of the earliest empirical works on the trade-
conflict debate is by Russett9 who conducted factor 
analysis from 1945-67, and concluded that nations that 
were linked by trade were more likely to engage in war 
than dyads who did not share such a connection. 
Interestingly, Russett noted that trade is negatively 
correlated with the geographical proximity of states, 
which is also a contributing variable that impacts the 
frequency of wars. Russett’s work is important to our 
study, not only because it is considered seminal and 
                     
9 Bruce Russett et al., International Regions and the International 
System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967). 
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represents one of the earliest empirical studies of the 
trade-conflict debate, but because his findings relate 
more to the positional closeness of these states when 
considering the correlation between proximity and war.10  
Moreover, some of the states that were used in the data 
set included several colonial powers that had, what could 
be characterized as, artificial levels of trade and 
conflict.  
Wallensteen11 took a different approach and used 
contingency tables for his analysis, which spanned the 
years 1920-68.12  He concluded that not all trade between 
states promotes peace, and argued that asymmetric trading 
relationships can lead to conflict between states.13  The 
main point is that when states are in an asymmetric trading 
relationship, the independent states (the “top dogs” in the 
trading relationship) might threaten or actually make 
                     
10 For more on the debate about the correlation between geographical 
closeness and war, see: James P. Weslay, "Frequency of Wars and 
Geographical Opportunity." Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, no. 4 
(December 1962), David Garnham, "Dyadic International War 1816-1965: 
The Role of Power Parity and Geographical Proximity." The Western 
Political Quarterly 29, no. 2 (June 1976), and John A. Vasquez, "Why Do 
Neighbors Fight?: Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality." Journal 
of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (August 1995). 
11 Peter Wallensteen, Structure and War: On International Relations 
1920-1968 (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1973). 
12 In conducting his study, Wallensteen used three variables: 
center-periphery dichotomy, impact of interaction on the interacting 
countries, and types of social orders these countries represent. 
13 For more on symmetric and asymmetric trading relationships, see: 
David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), and Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali. "From Commercial 
Competition to Strategic Rivalry to War: The Evolution of the Anglo-
Dutch Rivalry, 1609-1652." In The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries, ed. 
Paul F. Diehl. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), and Nazli 
Choucri and Robert North. Nations in Conflict: National Growth and 
International Violence. (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975). 
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demands of dependent (“under dog”) trading states whereby 
the situation can escalate to the point of an MID or even 
war.  Conversely, the data also showed that conflict 
between “top dog” states decreased as their interdependence 
increased.  Wallensteen’s approach is particularly useful 
in that he not only discussed trade and conflict, but also 
the quality of the trade.  This is important as it suggests 
that only mutually beneficial trade fosters interdependence 
and thus promotes peace. 
C. TRADE DECREASES CONFLICT (LIBERAL VIEW) 
Many of the recent empirical studies provide 
stronger support for the liberal argument – trade 
decreases conflict. Polachek14 departed from the 
previously mentioned studies and adopted a dyadic level 
of analysis, influencing the majority of all future 
trade-conflict research. For the first time in the trade-
conflict debate, data was used from the Conflict and 
Peace Data Bank (COPDAB)15 that contained data from the 
analysis of thirty states from 1958-67.  From this data, 
Polachek developed an index based on the net frequency of 
conflict (NETF) as a means to compress the vast amount of 
information contained in the COPDAB and to define his 
dependent variable.  This NETF index is important to the 
trade-conflict debate as it presented future scholars 
with a means to effectively organize the COPDAB data into 
                     
14 Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (March 1980). 
15 For more on COPDAB, see: E. E. Azar, The Codebook of the Conflict 
and Peace Databank (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1980) 
and E. E. Azar, "The Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB) Project," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 24 (March 1980). 
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a useable form.16  Polachek defined the independent 
variable as the level of the material well-being of a 
state.17  The study showed a clear negative correlation 
between trade and conflict. It found that the higher the 
level of trade that exists between two states, the more 
costly the conflict.  Surprisingly though, when the NETF 
is disaggregated by type of interaction, elasticity shows 
a negative to mildly positive correlation between trade 
and some conflict actions.  This is problematic, as trade 
might not have a significant impact on severe forms of 
conflict.   
Polachek continued to work on his model and later 
teamed up with Gasiorowski to examine trade linkages 
between the United States and Warsaw Pact states.18  The 
authors concluded that there is a negative hyperbolic 
relationship between trade and conflict from 1971-75, but 
                     
16 NETF is calculated by subtracting cooperative from conflict 
events.  A score < 0 means a cooperative environment exists while a 
score > 0 means a conflict environment exists.  Conflict events are 
those categorized by scores of 9-15 and cooperative events as those 
between 1 and 7.  
17 A country's welfare function is defined as: w = w ( c , z ) where 
c and z are desired consumption and existing hostility respectively.  
Furthermore, the equation c = q + m - x states that desired consumption 
equals (q) total production plus imports (m) minus exports (x).  These 
formulas show that countries with high levels of imports and exports 
will experience high costs as (c) decreases. 
18 The authors chose the Warsaw Pact countries instead of the USSR 
due to the political and economic integration that tended to create one 
trading block instead of individual trading nations.  Mark Gasiorowski 
and Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade 
and Linkages in the Era of Detente," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
26, no. 4 (December 1982). 
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there is less causality from 1976-78.19  While the 
analysis used COPDAB as the dependent variable, as was 
the case in Polachek’s previous study, this analysis drew 
on real quarterly U.S. dollar figures of trade from 1967-
78 as the dependent variable.20  Once a correlation 
between trade and conflict had been determined, the 
causality was assessed and found to flow from trade to 
conflict.21   
Gasiorowski22 later conducted his own analysis where 
he disagreed with both Polachek’s original work and 
surprisingly, a work he co-authored with Polachek.23  His 
                     
19 The authors attribute this deviance to the Jackson-Vanik and 
Stevenson amendments (which addressed allowing a larger number of 
Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel) and the subsequent rescinding of 
the Moscow accord as contributing factors that overwhelmed the benefits 
of trade.   
20 In using the COPDAB data, the authors defined conflict as either 
directed by the United States toward the Warsaw Pact or conflict 
directed by the Warsaw Pact to the United States.  In addition, the 
authors noted that using the U.S. dollar to measure United States - 
Warsaw Pact trade is not ideal, but commented that it was the best data 
available that was compiled on a quarterly basis. 
21 For more on the analysis method developed by Granger, see: C.W.J 
Granger, "Investigating Causal Relations by Economic Models and Cross-
Spectral Methods," Econometrica 37 (August 1969).  For more on 
Polachek’s claims, see: Solomon W. Polachek and Judith McDonald, 
"Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, 
Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and 
Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), and Solomon W. Polachek, 
"Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship 
Between International Trade and Cooperation," Review of International 
Economics 5, no. 3 (1997). 
22 Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International 
Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," International Studies 
Quarterly 30, no. 1 (March 1986). 
23 Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (March 1980) and Mark Gasiorowski and 
Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and 
Linkages in the Era of Detente," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, 
no. 4 (December 1982). 
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argument was that Polachek did not use the intensity 
weights of the COPDAB data and instead opted for a +1 or 
-1 rating approach to measure the level of conflict.24  
Moreover, Gasiorowski argued that the dollar value of 
trade used to measure the “gains from trade” were 
misleading because it was not considered as a measure of 
GNP.25  In the later co-authored work, Gasiorowski 
asserted that while trade did help both the United States 
and the Warsaw Pact states, the level of trade never 
increased appreciably or reached a level high enough to 
cause true interdependence, thus characterizing the 
results as based on interconnectedness.  In his own work, 
Gasiorowski used the same COPDAB data set for his 
dependent variable, but developed a new three-step method 
to measure conflict (CONF).26  In this case, 
interdependence was viewed as a set of relationships that 
can be either costly or beneficial to a state. To measure 
the costs or benefits, a new set of independent variables 
were identified which focused on gross domestic product 
                     
24 Gasiorowski's point was that since the intensity weights were not 
used, then a friendly diplomatic gesture would have the same, but 
numerically opposite, effect as all-out war. 
25 Gasiorowski described the following example using Polochek's 
calculation: Norway had $408 million in trade with the United States, 
which represented about 7% of its total trade in 1970. Norway would 
have a greater incentive to reduce conflict with the United States than 
the Dominican Republic who had 311$ million in trade with the United 
States, representing 63% of its total trade, because Norway had a 
larger total dollar value. 
26 Gasiorowski described his three-step method as first including 
all events by country (A) from 1960-77.  Second, the conflict or 
cooperation intensity rating for each event was multiplied by the 
percentage of trade from country (A’s) total trade.  Third, the trade 
weighted intensities were totaled and divided by the total number of 
events in the testing period. 
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per capita and import price elasticity.27  It is 
interesting that the results were mixed and supported 
both schools of thought on the trade-conflict debate.  
The principle conclusion was that interdependence does 
produce increased international conflict.  It should be 
noted though, that conflict does not necessarily equate 
to MIDs or even war because the COPDAB data included many 
intensity-increasing events that fall short of this 
extreme.  As such, the data only shows that 
interdependence increases tension, not necessarily 
conflict.  Alternately, the data also shows that trade 
volume is negatively correlated to conflict, which 
appears to support Wallensteen’s argument that mutually 
beneficial trade lowers conflict.28  Gasiorowski advanced 
the trade-conflict debate by redefining the definitions 
of interdependence as well as identifying new independent 
variables to measure the effects of trade 
interdependence. 
Oneal and his group of colleagues have added a 
significant body of research to the trade-conflict 
                     
27 For the specific variables, see: Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National 
Evidence," International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (March 1986): 34. 
28 Peter Wallensteen, Structure and War: On International Relations 
1920-1968 (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1973). 
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debate.29  While their research focused more on the 
democratic peace theory debate, they did include 
variables into their studies that account for the 
interdependency between states, mainly trade.  They 
further expanded the study by including non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) into their analysis.30  Though the 
methodology for these studies differed from previous 
studies, the independent variable was MIDs, not just 
conflict, and the authors were the first to use logit 
analysis.31  Through their repeated analyses, which often 
included differing independent variables with each study, 
they always came to the conclusion that trade is 
negatively correlated to MIDs.  While the studies clearly 
support the argument that trade interdependence does 
prevent MIDs, assessing the findings by comparing them is 
made difficult by the variety of variables used across 
                     
29 See: John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Moaz and Bruce 
Russett, "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and 
International Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 
1996), John R. Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Test of the Democratic 
Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85," Political 
Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce 
M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies 
Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, 
"Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade 
Still Reduces Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 
1999), and Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal and David R. Davis, "The Third 
Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and 
Militarized Disputes, 1950-85," International Organization 52, no. 3 
(Summer 1998). 
30 See: Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal and David R. Davis, "The Third 
Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and 
Militarized Disputes, 1950-85," International Organization 52, no. 3 
(Summer 1998). 
31 For more on their dependent variable, see: John A. Vasquez, "The 
Steps to War: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War 
Findings," World Politics 40, no. 1 (October 1987). 
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the studies.  Many of the works have been written by a 
small number of scholars who have tested theories using 
differing methodologies and have sometimes even ended up 
countering their previous work.       
Barbieri and Levy took a different approach to their 
research, and unlike previous attempts to find a 
correlation between trade and conflict, the authors 
examined how war affects trade by conducting an 
interrupted time series study.32  This methodology enabled 
the authors to examine the issue over a large period of 
time, from 1870 to 1992, and detect trends of decreasing 
trade before and during wars.  Their analysis, based on 
war level data from the COW data set and trade data from 
a previous work,33 was applied to Lewis-Beck’s formula.34  
Barbieri and Levy concluded that war would lower the 
level of trade between dyads, but that the lower level of 
trade is not statistically significant. Thus, their 
findings did not support the liberal argument.  Later, 
Anderson and Carter35 responded to Barbieri and Levy with 
their own study, and examined the impact of war on trade 
at the dyadic level.  Similarly, Anderson and Carter 
                     
32 See: Katherine Barbieri, "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of 
War on Trade." Journal of Political Research 36, no. 4 (1999). 
33 Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence and Militarized 
Interstate Conflict, 1870-1985" (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 
1995). 
34 See: Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Some Economic Effects of Revolution: 
Models, Measurements, and the Cuban Evidence," American Journal of 
Sociology 84, no. 5 (1979). 
35 Charles H. Anderson and John R. Carter, "The Impact of War on 
Trade: An Interrupted Time-Series Study," Journal of Peace Research 38, 
no. 4 (July 2001). 
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utilized the COW data set, but identified different 
dyads, and decided to measure trade differently than 
Barbieri and Levy by utilizing a supply and demand model.  
Anderson and Carter found a strong negative correlation, 
and concluded that war and the lead-up to war lower the 
amount of trade between dyads.  While their conclusion 
countered the findings of Barbieri and Levy, their 
findings were much stronger with an average R-squared of 
0.85 among all dyads tested. 
D. CIVIL WAR AND TRADE 
In addition to the above literature that has 
examined the trade-conflict debate from a more 
international perspective by principally addressing the 
issue of international trade, the following literature 
focuses on the economic effects of civil war, both 
internal and spillover effects.36  Of primary importance 
to this thesis are the works by Bayer and Rupert and 
Murdoch and Sandler, as these works, more than the 
others, address the issues of trade and economic growth 
and how they are correlated to civil war. 
                     
36 The principal works in this study are: James C. Murdoch and Todd 
Sandler. "Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers." Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (February 2002), James C. Murdoch and 
Todd Sandler. "Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion." 
American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 1 (January 2004), Paul 
Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002), Paul Collier, V.L. 
Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas 
Sambanis. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. 
(New York: Oxford University Press & World Bank, 2003), Paul Collier, 
"On the Economic Consequences of Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 51, 
no. 1 (1999), Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, comp. Greed and 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2000), and Resat Bayer, and Matthew C. Rupert. "Effects of Civil Wars 
on International Trade, 1950-92." Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 6 
(2004). 
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Murdoch and Sandler addressed the issue by examining 
the influences of civil war on the per capita income 
level for both the state that is experiencing civil war 
and its neighbors, with the goal to measure the long- and 
short-term effects of civil war on per capita income.37  
The dependent variable was defined by a neoclassical 
growth model that took into account human capital, while 
the independent variable was compiled from multiple 
sources.38  Murdoch and Sandler concluded that civil war 
significantly decreases per capita income in the short-
term, and that the data is less clear on the long-term 
effects.39  Later, Murdoch and Sandler expanded their 
study by extending the analysis beyond states that share 
a border with a country that is experiencing civil war. 
They concluded that the damaging economic effects of 
civil war would extend beyond those states that share a 
border with a country experiencing civil war.40  More 
importantly though, they found that a state experiencing 
civil war would have a significant reduction in the rate 
of economic growth: 85 percent on the short-term growth 
and 31 percent on the long-term growth.  Bayer and Rupert 
chose a different route and examined the effect of civil 
                     
37 James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Economic Growth, Civil Wars, 
and Spatial Spillovers." Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 
(February 2002). 
38 Penn World Tables, Correlates of War, and Civil Wars data sets. 
39 The short-term periods cover 4 to 5 years while long-term is 
defined as 20 to 25. 
40 James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler. "Civil Wars and Economic 
Growth: Spatial Dispersion." American Journal of Political Science 48, 
no. 1 (January 2004). 
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war on bilateral trade.41  Similar to the Murdoch and 
Sandler studies, Bayer and Rupert relied on known data 
sets such as COW and the Penn World Table to pool time 
series cross section data from 1949 to 1992.  The 
dependent variable for their study was nominal logged 
total dyadic trade and was measured by t + 1.42  The 
research examined five hypotheses and used an equal 
number of unique variables.  Their analysis found that 
civil wars do have a negative impact on dyadic trade. The 
finding is similar to many of the liberal trade-conflict 
arguments. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The above literature review addresses the large body 
of political science, international relations, and economic 
literature that is pertinent to the study of domestic trade 
and its correlation to militarized inter-state disputes and 
civil war – the focal point of this thesis.  Russett and 
Wallensteen, the major proponents of the realist view, 
argue that trade can increase the number of incidents of 
inter-state disputes, especially when considering the 
geographical proximity of states and the quality of the 
trade between them.  Russett’s notion, that geographical 
proximity between states influences inter-state conflict, 
is important and will need to be controlled during testing.  
The opposing group of liberal scholars who advocate that 
                     
41 Resat Bayer and Matthew C. Rupert, "Effects of Civil Wars on 
International Trade, 1950-92." Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 6 
(2004). 
42 For specifics on this variable, see: Katherine Barbieri, 
"Economic Interdependence and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1870-
1985" (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 1995). 
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trade decreases the propensity of inter-state conflict uses 
differing methodologies, timeframes, and data sets. Yet, 
these scholars generally arrive at the same conclusion.  
Our study uses regression methodology, which is similar to 
the research of Polachek and Gasiorowski. However, unlike 
the scholars who utilized the dyad as the unit of analysis, 
we used a cross-sectional analysis of pooled time-series 
data.  This thesis diverges from Polachek and Gasiorowski 
in the unit of analysis primarily due to differences in 
data sets because our time-series data does not support 
dyadic analysis.  Additionally, our study departs from 
previous research, which focuses on international trade as 
the independent variable.  We utilized domestic trade,43 
which is used in the research of Murdoch and Sandler, as 
our independent variable.   
The following chapter outlines in greater detail the 
specifics about how we built upon the relevant literature 
and drew together elements of Russett, Polachek, 
Gasiorowski, Murdoch, and Sandler, along with new 
elements, to construct a methodology to test the study’s 
overarching thesis and supporting propositions.             
 
 
                     
43 Murdoch and Sandler examined the relationship of civil war with 
per capita income. For our study, we will use the real per capital 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
A. INTRODUCTION    
In this chapter, we will examine the peace through 
trade theory by testing the propositions mentioned in 
Chapter I.  The field of international trade and its 
correlation to inter-state violence benefits from extensive 
academic research.  However, the approach adopted by this 
thesis is different from previous research in that the 
center of examination is not international trade, but 
domestic trade.  Since this field - examining the 
correlation between domestic trade and conflict - remains 
largely uncharted, this thesis will rely heavily on the 
research and methodologies advanced by those discussing the 
correlation between international trade and inter-state 
conflict that were highlighted in Chapter II. 
In testing the correlation between domestic trade and 
inter- and intra-state violence, the research methodology 
for this thesis took the form of a time-series cross-
sectional analysis of pooled data, both previously 
collected conflict data sets and published economic data.  
This statistical approach enabled us to consider and 
include in the testing as many cases as possible since the 
testing was only limited by the scope and quality of the 
data.  One such limitation is the lack of quality economic 
data prior to 1950.44  The thesis tested the effects of 
domestic trade on violence, in general, and the previously 
mentioned four propositions specifically, using a 
                     
44 The analysis will stop at 1997 to match the Causality of War 
datasets. 
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regression analysis of the pooled data.  The unit of 
analysis for examining the correlation between domestic 
trade and inter-state conflict and civil war was time-
series data that came from annual observations of collected 
data.45  Some studies further refine the dyads and limit 
those included in the analysis by adding a filter that 
removes dyads that do not have two politically relevant 
states.46  This approach tries to limit dyads to those that 
are considered “politically relevant” by seeking to remove 
from the analysis those dyads that contain states which are 
not contiguous and where at least one of the states that 
comprise the dyad is not characterized as a major power by 
the Correlates of War project.47  Utilizing this type of 
filter is understandable, especially when considering that 
Oneal and company focused their research solely on 
international conflict where the consideration of 
contiguous or weak states might be irrelevant to their 
analysis.   
                     
45 See John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Moaz and Bruce Russett, 
"The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International 
Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1996), John R. 
Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Test of the Democratic Peace: Controlling 
for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85," Political Research Quarterly 
50, no. 4 (December 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The 
Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 
1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace 
with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," Journal 
of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 1999). 
46 For a further discussion on this and a discussion of how 
contiguity affects dyads, see: Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 309-41. 
47 See: John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Moaz and Bruce Russett, 
"The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International 
Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1996). 
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Since the focus of this thesis is on the correlation 
between domestic trade and violence, utilizing such an 
approach for our analysis might not only unnecessarily 
remove dyads from consideration, but also significantly 
distort our findings especially when testing the 
correlation of domestic trade with intra-state violence 
(which makes dyadic analysis unnecessary).  As such, this 
analysis did not utilize a dyadic level of analysis.   
Furthermore, in order to not ignore some of the variables 
that are meant to be controlled by using only politically 
relevant dyads, this thesis utilized several controls that 
sought to account for certain particular differences 
between the states used in our testing. These are discussed 
below. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The analysis for this thesis was constrained by two 
factors: the availability of usable data sets and the time 
frame or span of coverage by those data sets.  
Specifically, this analysis utilized data sets from the 
Correlates of War (COW) project and Penn World Tables, each 
of which have different start and end points as to the data 
covered.  For example, we utilized the (COW) Intra-State 
War (v3.0) data set, which covers conflicts within states 
or incidents of civil war from 1816 to 1997.48  The start 
date is not problematic, but the data ending date of 1997 
limited our testing of the correlation of domestic trade to 
internal conflict up until and including 1997.   
                     
48 Meredith Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 
1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18., 1 (2000): 123-144. 
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Similarly, the thesis used the (COW) Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (v3.1) data set, which covers all 
instances of when one state threatened another state, or 
displayed/used force against another state from 1816-2001.49  
Similar to the previous data set, the start date was not 
problematic and 2001 served as the last year for our 
analysis of the correlation between domestic trade and 
international conflict.   
Moreover, we made use of data from the Penn World 
Table (PWT) data set, which contains specific state 
economic data on an annual basis from 1950 to 2004.50  Since 
the start date for this data set is the latest, it served 
as the starting point for all of the testing in this 
thesis.  Additionally, even though the PWT data set ends in 
2004, the use of data beyond 2001 was limited by the two 
aforementioned data sets. 
Taken together, this thesis featured analysis of the 
above data sets from 1950 to 1997 when examining the 
correlation between domestic trade and intra-state or civil 
war violence and from 1950 to 2001 when examining the 
correlation between domestic trade and inter-state 
violence.  Utilizing different start dates was not a 
concern as the Intra-State War (v3.0) and Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (v3.1) data sets each examine the 
                     
49 Faten Ghosn, Geln Plamer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID3 Dataset, 
1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, no. 21 (2004): 133-154. 
50 Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 6.2 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2006).  For more 
on the data set, see: Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "The Penn World 
Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-
1988," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (May 1991). 
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correlation issue from a different perspective; the former 
focuses on internal conflict while the latter examines 
international conflict.                     
Lastly, in order to test the hypothesis and four 
associated propositions, this thesis utilized a linear 
regression method, with the X and Y axes representing the 
independent and dependent variables respectively. At the 
conclusion of the testing, the thesis and the propositions 
will be proven true if there is an inverse linear or 
hyperbolic relationship between the two variables.  The 
thesis will then transition to the conclusion and policy 
implications chapter to discuss how our conclusions can be 
incorporated into future policy.  
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Since it is the intent of this thesis to examine the 
correlation between domestic trade and conflict, it was 
necessary to identify a means to accurately measure such 
trade.  As aforesaid, much of the research in this field 
focuses on the correlation between international trade and 
conflict. As such, most of the methodologies are built 
around the flows of international trade, usually between 
dyadic pairs.51  Because of this, it was necessary to 
identify a methodology that differed in scope by focusing 
specifically on the trade that takes place within a state.  
Working toward this end, and seeking a meaningful measure 
                     
51 Refer to Chapter II for an overview of previous research 
methodologies. 
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of domestic trade, the thesis relied on the research 
surrounding the study of civil war and trade.52        
In doing so, we borrowed from the research 
methodologies of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler53, and James 
Fearon and David Laitin54 who use GDP in constructing their 
independent variable, but with slight differences in their 
approaches.  Collier and Hoeffler, for example, argue that 
civil wars are sustained when the rebels have the ability 
to loot natural resources and threaten local populations.  
They go on to say that this process can be prevented if the 
state is strong, which they define as per capita gross 
domestic product. They conclude that strong states will 
have the bureaucratic apparatus to prevent or quell 
rebellions.   
While Collier and Hoeffler approach civil war from a 
different angle, their use of GDP was useful in 
                     
52 The principal works in this study are: James C. Murdoch and Todd 
Sandler. "Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers." Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (February 2002), James C. Murdoch and 
Todd Sandler. "Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion." 
American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 1 (January 2004), Paul 
Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. "Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002), Paul Collier, V.L. 
Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas 
Sambanis. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. 
(New York: Oxford University Press & World Bank, 2003), Paul Collier, 
"On the Economic Consequences of Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 51, 
no. 1 (1999), Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, comp. Greed and 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2000), and Resat Bayer, and Matthew C. Rupert. "Effects of Civil Wars 
on International Trade, 1950-92." Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 6 
(2004). 
53 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievances in Civil 
War," Oxford Economic Papers, no. 56 (2004): 563-95. 
54 James Fearon, D., and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgence, and 
Civil War," American Political Science Review, 97, 1 (2003): 75-90. 
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constructing our independent variable.55  The methodology of 
Fearon and Laitin is similar in that they use GDP as a 
measure of state strength, but they reject the role of 
commodity exports in explaining civil war.  Similar to 
Collier and Hoeffler, the state strength approach used by 
Fearon and Laitin uses GDP, as well as other empirical 
data, to measure state strength.56 
Though the above two camps are separated by slight 
differences in methodology, both use GDP as a component of 
their state strength measurement, which is a central part 
of both arguments. They both argue that GDP lowers the risk 
of civil war, but differ in the reason for their findings.  
Collier and Hoeffler argue that a high GDP results in lower 
rates of poverty, which decreases the "demand" for civil 
war.  Fearon and Laitin, on the other hand, contend that 
GDP is correlated to state strength and that low rates of 
GDP would result in a weak state that would not be able to 
prevent or suppress civil war.  Though different views 
exist as to the relationship between GDP and the 
possibility of civil war, both sets of scholars show the 
usefulness of using GDP in their methodology. This approach 
was used in this thesis and expanded by examining the 
correlation between GDP and inter-state disputes.57    
                     
55 See Collier and Hoeffler (2004) for more on their use of GDP in 
creating their economic opportunity structure to explain the 
relationship between grievance and civil war, rebellion, and 
insurgence. 
56 Refer to Fearon and Laitin (2003) for the specifics on their 
method of measuring state strength. 
57 Ibid., 563-95. 
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Considering the above, the independent variable for 
this study is domestic trade, which we defined and 
quantified using the following formula: 
 
Domestic Trade = C + I + G 
 
The above formula is derived from the standard formula 
for Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 
 
GDP = C + I + G + (X-M) 
 
Where (C) equals consumption, (I) equals gross 
investment, (G) equals government spending, (X) equals 
exports, and (M) equals imports.  To isolate domestic 
trade, we removed the (X-M) portion of the equation because 
it was not relevant for this analysis.  The remaining 
components of GDP measure domestic absorption, or domestic 
expenditures and are included in the quantification of 
domestic trade.  In addition, the subcomponents, C, I, and 
G, were tested independently against the dependent variable 
to measure the influence of each subcomponent. 
This analysis utilized real per-capita GDP in order to 
adjust for inflation and price changes and represent the 
purchasing power of each member of society.  Moreover, a 
per-capita GDP allowed our analysis to equitably compare 
the GDP between two or more states by considering GDP per-
person and not just total GDP. 
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The data used to construct the independent variable is 
based upon the Penn World Table (Mark V).58  Utilizing the 
variables from the Penn World Table, the equation is: 
 
rgdpch = kc + kg +ki 
 
In this formula, rgdpch is the real GDP per capita in 
constant years based on the 2000 United States dollar. The 
variables kc, kg, and ki represent consumption, government 
spending, and investment respectively.  In order to take 
into account the time difference required for changes in 
the independent variable to show in the dependent variable, 
a one-year lag was applied to all GDP data.  For example, 
economic data for the year 1999 was compared to events in 
2000. The assumption was that a change in GDP, either an 
increase or a decrease, would take approximately one year 
to have an effect on the dependent variable.     
D. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Much of the recent scholarship on the trade-conflict 
debate utilizes data from the Correlates of War (COW) 
project to construct the dependent variable.  As such, this 
thesis defined the dependent variables (international 
conflict and civil war) by utilizing components of this 
same data set, specifically the Intra-State War and 
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data sets.59  While 
                     
58 See Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 
5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 (May 1991). 
59 Meredith Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 
1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18, 1 (2000): 123-144. 
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limited because the data ends in 1997, both are well 
respected and have been used for constructing the dependent 
variable in many previous studies.  This time-series data 
is important, as it provided a large number (N) of 
observations to compare with the independent variable.60 
Specifically, this analysis utilized two data sets 
from the Correlates of War (COW) project.  We used the 
(COW) Intra-State War (v3.0) data set, which covers 
conflicts within states or incidents of civil war between 
1816 and 1997.61  Since the end year for this data set is 
                     
60 See the following for empirical studies utilizing the COW data 
set: Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System. 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), Peter Wallensteen, Structure and War: On 
International Relations 1920-1968. (Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1973),  
Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade." The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 24, no. 1 (March 1980), Solomon W. Polachek and Judith 
McDonald. "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation." In 
Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas 
Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey, 273-284. (New York: Praeger, 1992), 
Solomon W. Polachek, "Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: 
The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation." Review 
of International Economics 5, no. 3 (1997), Mark Gasiorowski and 
Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and 
Linkages in the Era of Detente." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, 
no. 4 (December 1982), and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National 
Evidence." International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (March 1986): 23-
38. For MIDSs see: John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett. "Assessing the 
Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces 
Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 1999), John R. 
Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Test of the Democratic Peace: Controlling 
for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85." Political Research Quarterly 
50, no. 4 (December 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett. "The 
Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
Conflict, 1950-1985." International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 
1997), John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Moaz and Bruce Russett. 
"The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International 
Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1996), and 
Katherine Barbieri, "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on 
Trade," Journal of Political Research 36, no. 4 (1999). 
61 For the specific criterion for this data set, see: Meredith 
Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," 
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18, 1 (2000): 123-144. 
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1997, this thesis focused on testing the correlation 
between domestic trade and internal conflict up to and 
including that year.   
Similarly, the thesis used the (COW) Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (v3.1) data set which covers all 
instances of when one state threatened another state, or 
displayed/used force against another state from 1816-2001.62  
Similar to the previous data set, 2001 is the last covered 
year and thus served as the end year for our analysis of 
the correlation between domestic trade and international 
conflict.   
E. CONTROL VARIABLES 
 In keeping with the scholarly literature in the 
international trade-conflict and civil war fields, this 
thesis controlled for certain peculiarities by 
incorporating regime type, geographical proximity, and 
military capability ratios into our testing. 
1. Regime Type 
 Fearon and Laitin63 and Doyle64 point out that 
political instability, and by extension the “liberalness” 
of a state, may be an indicator of state oppression and 
                     
62 For the specific criterion for this data set see: Faten Ghosn, 
Geln Plamer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID3 Dataset, 1993-2001: 
Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict Management and 
Peace Science, no. 21 (2004): 133-154. 
63 James Fearon, D., and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgence, and 
Civil War," American Political Science Review, 97, 1 (2003): 75-90. 
64 Michael Doyle, "Ideologies and Politics: Liberal Democracy and 
National Dictatorship in Peace and War," in War and Peace in the 20th 
Century and Beyond, ed. Geir Lundestad and Olav Njolstad (Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2002): 52-75. 
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strength, and thus, its ability to prevent or quell 
rebellion or civil war.  As such, a state that is not 
considered “liberal” may experience rebellion or civil war 
at a higher rate than states classified as liberal.65  This 
thesis sought to control for regime type by adopting 
Doyle’s approach of measuring states according to four 
“Kantian” intuitions: “market and private property 
economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens 
who possess juridical rights; and ‘republican’ (whether 
republican or parliamentary monarchy), representative, 
government.66”  Based on this approach, states considered 
liberal received a score of 1 and states considered 
“otherwise” received a score of 0. 
2. Region 
 Russett and Oneal and Ray contend that states that 
have strong economic ties are half as likely to initiate 
inter-state conflict toward each other compared to dyads 
with weak or non-existent trade relationships.67  Moreover, 
his research found that the level of dyadic trade was 
correlated to geographical proximity and contiguity. This 
                     
65 Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Niles Gleditsch, 
"Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?  Democracy, Political Change, and 
Civil War, 1816-1992," American Political Science Review, no. 95 
(2001): 33-48. 
66 Michael Doyle, "Ideologies and Politics: Liberal Democracy and 
National Dictatorship in Peace and War," in War and Peace in the 20th 
Century and Beyond, ed. Geir Lundestad and Olav Njolstad (Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2002): 60. 
67 See: Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International 
System. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), and John R. Oneal and James Lee 
Ray, "New Test of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic 
Interdependence, 1950-85," Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 
(December 1997). 
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means, by extension, that geographical proximity and inter-
state conflict are correlated.  As such, we included in our 
testing the means to determine the region of the World in 
which each state in our testing belonged.  We used the 2009 
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), which in addition 
to acting as a global benchmark for development, assign 
states to one of six global regions.68         
3. Military Capability Ratio 
 Henderson and Singer, Singer et al, Bremer, Oneal and 
Russett, Oneal et al, and Spiro each include the military 
capability ratio in their analyses.69  The ratio is from the 
COW National Military Capabilities (v3.02) data set which 
measures six different elements of national power: energy 
consumption, steel and iron production, military 
expenditure, military personnel, total population, and 




(accessed May 01, 2009).  In addition, see: Douglas M. Stinnett, 
Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman, "The 
Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3," Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, 2, 19 (2002): 58-66. 
69 See: Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, "Civil War in the 
Post-Colonial World, 1946-1992," Journal of Peace Research, no. 37 
(2000): 275-99, David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, 
"Capability, Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-
1965," in Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1972): 19-48, Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 309-41, John R. Oneal and 
Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative 
Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," Journal of Peace 
Research 36, no. 4 (July 1999), John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev 
Moaz and Bruce Russett. "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, 
and International Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 
(February 1996), and David Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal 
Peace," International Security, no. 19 (1994): 50-86. 
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urban population.70  These elements are also combined in an 
equally weighted formula to produce a state’s Composite 
Index of National Capability (CINC).  Singer and Small use 
the CINC to compare the ratio of two dyadic states to 
determine the ratio between the two CINC scores.71  In its 
subparts, the measure of a state’s total population and 
military expenditure can also be used to control variances 
between large and small states as well as the effect of 
militarization on rebellion and civil war.72 
F. PROPOSITIONS AND TESTING 
The following two propositions comprised the overall 
thesis for our analysis and were each tested independently 
utilizing the above methodology and control variables.  In 
this section, we will outline the manner in which the 
following propositions were tested. 
1. (P.1) High levels of domestic trade will lower a 
state’s propensity to initiate a militarized inter-state 
dispute. 
In testing P.1, we examined the relationship between 
the independent variable (domestic trade) and the dependent 
variable (the COW MID data set).  We also utilized the 
control variables (regime type, geographical proximity, and 
military capability ratio) so as to include the 
                     
70 David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability, 
Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Peace, 
War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972). 
71 J. David and Melvin Small Singer, "Alliance Aggregation and the 
Onset of War, 1816-1965," in Quantitative International Politics, ed. 
David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968): 247-86. 
72 Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and 
Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003). 
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subcomponent population.  As mentioned previously, we built 
a one-year lag into our testing in order for changes in the 
independent variable to be seen in the dependent variable.  
In testing this proposition, we were expecting that the 
independent variable would decrease prior to an increase in 
conflict intensity in the dependent variable. 
2. (P.2) High levels of domestic trade will 
lower a state’s propensity to fall into civil war. 
In testing P.2, we examined the relationship between 
the independent variable (domestic trade) and the dependent 
variable (the COW Intra-State War v3.0 data set).  We also 
utilized the control variables (regime type and military 
capability ratio) so as to include the subcomponent 
population and military expenditures.  As with P.1, we 
built a one-year lag into our testing in order for changes 
in the independent variable to be seen in the dependent 
variable. In testing this proposition, we expected that the 
independent variable would decrease prior to the initiation 
of rebellion or civil war in the dependent variable. 
G. METHOD FOR TESTING 
In conducting the above testing, we utilized the 
statistical software, SPSS Statistics 17.0. 
H. SUMMARY AND DATA SETS 
In testing the correlation between domestic trade and 
violence, both inter- and intra-state, the research 
methodology for this thesis took the form of qualitative 
statistical analysis of both previously collected conflict 
data sets and published economic data.  Specifically, we 
utilized a cross-sectional analysis of pooled time-series 
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data in order to conduct tests on 180 states from 1950 to 
2004, which resulted in 9,735 testable cases.  The cases, 
which were the independent variable (rgdpch), were pulled 
from and defined by the Penn World Table (Mark V).  The 
dependent variables were defined as (hostscore) and 
(civilwar). They were drawn from two data sets: the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute (v3.1) data set and the 
(COW) Intra-State War (v3.0) data set.  The study employed 
three control variables: regime type, geographical region, 
and military capability ratio so as to include their six 
subcomponents for testing the study’s two propositions via 
SPSS statistical software.  Appendix A shows the codebook 
for our research and provides greater detail on the 
particulars of each variable.   
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IV. TESTING AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Utilizing the methodology described in the previous 
chapter, this chapter will discuss the testing and results.  
Specifically, we will describe the tests for each of the 
two propositions that comprise the overall hypothesis for 
the thesis.  In doing so, we will test each of the 
propositions utilizing linear regression to determine the 
correlation between the independent and dependent variables 
and then, using the aforesaid control variables, control 
for or isolate certain characteristics that may influence 
the overall results of the tests.  We conducted additional 
tests to explore unexpected results from the initial 
regression testing. 
B. CORRELATION OF VARIABLES  
The first test was an analysis of the Pearson 
Correlation between all of the variables: dependent, 
independent, and control. The results are displayed in 
table one. 
Correlations 
 rgdpch kc kg ki liberal tpop cinc hostscore civilwar
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.471** -.194** .319** .307** -.060** .129** -.036** -.128**
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000
rgdpch 
N 6909 6909 6909 6909 5841 6013 6013 6909 6909
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.471** 1 -.047** -.159** -.220** -.104** -.117** -.036** .057**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 .000
kc 




-.194** -.047** 1 -.085** -.150** .012 -.049** .052** .015
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 .348 .000 .000 .220
kg 
N 6909 6909 6909 6909 5841 6013 6013 6909 6909
Pearson 
Correlation 
.319** -.159** -.085** 1 .372** .073** .133** .056** -.134**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
ki 
N 6909 6909 6909 6909 5841 6013 6013 6909 6909
Pearson 
Correlation 
.307** -.220** -.150** .372** 1 .047** .112** -.006 -.101**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .621 .000
liberal 
N 5841 5841 5841 5841 6604 6604 6604 6604 6604
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.060** -.104** .012 .073** .047** 1 .627** .291** .002
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .348 .000 .000  .000 .000 .866
tpop 
N 6013 6013 6013 6013 6604 6781 6781 6781 6781
Pearson 
Correlation 
.129** -.117** -.049** .133** .112** .627** 1 .363** -.023
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .055
cinc 
N 6013 6013 6013 6013 6604 6781 6781 6781 6781
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.036** -.036** .052** .056** -.006 .291** .363** 1 .130**
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .003 .000 .000 .621 .000 .000  .000
hostscore 
N 6909 6909 6909 6909 6604 6781 6781 9735 9735
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.128** .057** .015 -.134** -.101** .002 -.023 .130** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .220 .000 .000 .866 .055 .000  
civilwar 
N 6909 6909 6909 6909 6604 6781 6781 9735 9735
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 1.   Correlation of Variables. 
The above table yields important and interesting 
results as to the correlation between each of the 
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variables, but in no way provides the final results for 
this analysis. Those results will be procured by using 
linear regression analysis. 
1. Correlation of (rgdpch) and Sub-Components 
The independent variable (rgdpch), which is used to 
test both propositions, shows a negative correlation with 
the dependent variable (hostscore) of -0.36. This result is 
statistically significant.  Additionally, the same variable 
(rgdpch) is negatively correlated to the dependent variable 
(civilwar) at -.128, which is also statistically 
significant.  From this, we can generalize that as a 
state’s (rgdpch) increases, its propensity to initiate 
inter-state conflict or to fall into civil war will 
decrease.  It is also interesting to note the correlation 
between (rgdpch) and (liberal) of 0.307, which is not only 
statistically significant, but is also expected. States 
with a rising or elevated (rgdpch) will generally show an 
increase in political liberalization.  The sub-components 
of the variable, (rgdpch), are (kc), (kg), and (ki). We 
compared each of these to the dependent variables, 
(hostscore) and (civilwar).  Examining the relationship 
between the sub-components and (hostscore), we found that 
all three are correlated to the dependent variable: (kc) -
.036, (kg) .052, and (ki) .056. All are statistically 
significant relationships.  Based on these results, we can 
generalize that as the consumption portion of (rgdpch) 
increases, that state’s propensity to initiate inter-state 
conflict decreases. However, as the government spending and 
investment portion of (rgdpch) increases, a state’s 
propensity to initiate inter-state conflict decreases.  The 
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relationship between the sub-components of (rgdpch) and 
(hostscore) are opposite to the correlation between the 
subcomponents and the dependent variable, (civilwar).  In 
this case, the relationship between the sub-components and 
(civilwar) are (kc) .057, (kg) 0.15, and (ki) -.134. The 
correlation for (kc) and (ki) is statistically significant, 
but the correlation for (kg) is not.  From these, we can 
generalize that, as the investment portion of (rgdpch) 
increases, that state’s propensity to fall into civil war 
decreases. However, as the consumption portion of (rgdpch) 
increases, a state’s propensity to fall into civil war 
increases. 
Considering the above results, we can conclude that as 
(rgdpch) increases, the propensity of a state to initiate 
inter-state conflict or fall into civil war will decrease.  
The results for the sub-components of (rgdpch) are not 
uniform in their correlation. However, they still produce 
statistically significant results that allow us to 
generalize that as a state’s consumption portion of 
(rgdpch) increases, the propensity of that state to 
initiate inter-state conflict will decrease.  Similarly, as 
the investment portion of (rgdpch) increases, the state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war will decrease. 
2. Correlation of (liberal) 
The control variable, (liberal), which is used as a 
control in our analysis, shows a negative correlation to 
the dependent variable (hostscore) of -.006. This result is 
not statistically significant. However, it does show a  
-.101 correlation with the dependent variable, (civilwar), 
which is statistically significant.  This result is very 
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interesting in that it shows that liberal and non-liberal 
states have a near equal propensity to initiate inter-state 
conflict. The results of this correlation analysis are 
robust because of the large N (6,604 cases).  This result 
is extremely interesting as many continue to debate the 
theory of democratic peace.73 While this result does not 
specifically address the theory of democracies fighting one 
another, it does address the debate over initiation of 
inter-state conflict. The debate features one side arguing 
that liberal states are less likely to initiate inter-state 
conflict. The other side maintains that non-liberal states 
are more likely to initiate inter-state conflict.74  As a 
result of our testing, we can generalize that liberal and 
non-liberal states have a near equal propensity to initiate 
inter-state conflict.  The correlation of (liberal) to 
(civilwar) is statistically significant and shows that 
liberal states are less likely than non-liberal states to 
                     
73 For more on the democratic peace theory, see: Dean V. Babst, , “A 
Force for Peace,” Industrial Research (1972), Melvin Small and David J. 
Singer, “The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965,” Jerusalem 
Journal of International Relations, no. 1 (1976), Zeev Maoz and Nasrin 
Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution (1989), Stuart A. Bremer, , “Democracy and 
Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965,” International 
Interactions, no. 18 (1993), and Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 
“Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” 
American Political Science Review, no. 87 (1993).     
74 For arguments that non-liberal states initiate conflict towards 
democracies more than democracies initiate conflict toward non-liberal 
states see: Dan Reiter and Allan C Stam, “Identifying the Culprit: 
Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation,” American Political 
Science Review, no. 97 (2003).  For arguments that liberal states 
initiate intra-state conflicts toward non-liberal states more than non-
liberal states initiate intra-state conflict towards each other see: 
Stephen L. Quackenbush and Michael Rudy, “Evaluating The Monadic 
Democratic Peace,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (April 20-23, 2006). 
http://www.missouri.edu/~polswww/papers/monadic%20democratic%20peace_MP
SA_.pdf (accessed April 30, 2009). 
 42
fall into civil war.75  These results are in keeping with 
the most recent scholarship on the effects of liberal 
governments on domestic violence and civil war. 
3. Correlation of (cinc) 
The control variable (cinc), which is a measure of a 
state’s military power, shows a positive correlation of 
.363 when compared to the dependent variable, (hostscore), 
which is statistically significant. The control variable 
(cinc) shows a negative correlation of -.023 when compared 
to the dependent variable, (civilwar), which is 
statistically insignificant.  Not considering the 
correlation to (civilwar) due to the insignificance of its 
correlation, we can generalize that as a state’s military 
capability increases so does its propensity to initiate 
inter-state conflict.                                         
C. TESTING (P.1) HIGH LEVELS OF DOMESTIC TRADE WILL LOWER 
A STATE’S PROPENSITY TO INITIATE A MILITARIZED INTER-
STATE DISPUTE 
After testing the correlation between the variables 
(independent, dependent, and control), we tested the first 
proposition of the hypothesis which argues that high levels 
of domestic trade will lower a state’s propensity to 
initiate a militarized inter-state dispute.  Unlike the 
                     
75 For more in the effect of liberal governments on domestic violence 
see: Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Niles Gleditsch, 
"Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?  Democracy, Political Change, and 
Civil War, 1816-1992," American Political Science Review, no. 95 
(2001): 33-48, Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned From The Holocaust? 
Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,” 
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), and Christian 
Davenport, and David A Armstrong II, “Democracy and The Violation of 
Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis From 1976 to 1996,” American 
Journal of Political Science 48, no. 3 (2004).    
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correlation analysis of the previous section, this test 
uses linear regression to test the proposition. 







1 rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .036a .001 .001 5.264
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 244.711 1 244.711 8.831 .003a 
Residual 191392.158 6907 27.710   
1 
Total 191636.869 6908    
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.570 .084  30.484 .0001 
rgdpch -2.378E-5 .000 -.036 -2.972 .003
a. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
Table 2.   Regression of (P.1), No Control Variables. 
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Analysis of Table 2 shows that the variances in the 
dependent variable, (hostscore), can be explained by 
variances in the independent variable, (rgdpch), less than 
one percent of the time.  Though the standard error is 5.26 
percent, the R-square and adjusted R-square are .001, which 
shows that the linear relationship between the two 
variables is statistically insignificant.  Examining the 
ANOVA, we find that the F of 8.831 is significant at .003, 
which is less than the alpha of .05.  From this, the ANOVA 
shows that (rgdpch) is a reliable predictor of change in 
(hostscore).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables, in 
that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 
2.38 units of change in (hostscore).  This is also 
statistically significant due to the p-value being below 
alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch) has a 
statistically insignificant linear relationship with 
(hostscore).  Even though the R-square is not significant, 
(rgdpch) is a reliable predictor of variance in 
(hostscore). For every unit of change in (rgdpch), there is 
a greater than double change in (hostscore).  From these 
results, we determine that (P.1) is proved true in that 
high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to initiate an inter-state dispute.        
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Figure 1.   (rgdpch) vs. (hostscore) Scatter Plot. 
 
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the linear 















1 rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 




liberal =  0 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .091a .008 .008 5.644
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
ANOVAb,c 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 943.966 1 943.966 29.636 .000a 
Residual 112439.437 3530 31.853   
1 
Total 113383.403 3531    
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 3.081 .114  27.092 .0001 
rgdpch -6.908E-5 .000 -.091 -5.444 .000
a. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
b. Selecting only cases for which liberal =  0 
Table 3.   Regression of (P.1), with Non-(liberal) States. 
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Analysis of Table 3 shows that the variances in the 
dependent variable, (hostscore), while controlling for Non-
(liberal) states, can be explained by variances in the 
independent variable, (rgdpch), less than one percent of 
the time.  Though the standard error is 5.64 percent, the 
R-square and adjusted R-square is .008, which shows that 
the linear relationship between the two variables is 
statistically insignificant.  Examining the ANOVA, we find 
that the F of 29.636 is significant at .000, which is less 
than the alpha of .05.  Based on this result, the ANOVA 
shows that (rgdpch) is a reliable predictor of change in 
(hostscore).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables. For 
every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 6.91 units 
of change in (hostscore).  This is also statistically 
significant due to the p-value being below alpha.  From 
this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch), when controlling 
for Non-(liberal) states, has a statistically insignificant 
linear relationship with (hostscore).  Even though the R-
square is not significant, (rgdpch) is a reliable predictor 
of variance in (hostscore). For every unit of change in 
(rgdpch), there is nearly seven times the change in 
(hostscore).  From these results, we determine that (P.1) 
is proved true in that high levels of domestic trade, when 
controlled for Non-(liberal) states, will lower a state’s 
propensity to initiate an inter-state dispute.  
Additionally, when controlling for Non-(liberal) states, 
changes in (rgdpch) will have a greater effect on 
(hostscore) than no changes in (rgdpch).  
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1 rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 




liberal =  1 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .044a .002 .001 5.451
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
ANOVAb,c 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 130.454 1 130.454 4.391 .036a 
Residual 68536.348 2307 29.708   
1 
Total 68666.802 2308    
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.502 .195  12.828 .0001 
rgdpch 3.416E-5 .000 .044 2.096 .036
a. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
b. Selecting only cases for which liberal =  1 
Table 4.   Regression of (P.1), with (liberal) States. 
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Analysis of table four shows that the variances in the 
dependent variable, (hostscore), while controlling for 
(liberal) states, can be explained by variances in the 
independent variable, (rgdpch), less than one percent of 
the time.  Though the standard error is 5.45 percent, the 
R-square and adjusted R-square are .002 and .001 
respectively. This shows that the linear relationship 
between the two variables is statistically insignificant.  
Examining the ANOVA, we find that the F of 4.391 is 
significant at .036, which is less than the alpha of .05.  
Based on this result, the ANOVA shows that (rgdpch) is a 
marginal predictor of change in (hostscore).  The 
coefficients for the test show that there is an inverse 
relationship between the two variables, in that for every 
unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 3.41 units of 
change in (hostscore).  This is also statistically 
significant due to the p-value being below alpha.  From 
this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch), when controlling 
for (liberal) states, has a statistically insignificant 
linear relationship with (hostscore).  Even though the R-
square is not significant, (rgdpch) is a marginal predictor 
of variance in (hostscore) and that for every unit of 
change in (rgdpch), there is more than three times the 
change in (hostscore).  From these results, we determine 
that (P.1) is proved true in that high levels of domestic 
trade, when controlled for (liberal) states, will lower a 
state’s propensity to initiate an inter-state dispute.  
Additionally, when controlling for (liberal) states, 
changes in (rgdpch) will have a greater effect on 
(hostscore) than no changes in (rgdpch). 
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1 cinc, rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .357a .127 .127 5.193
a. Predictors: (Constant), cinc, rgdpch 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 23599.066 2 11799.533 437.523 .000a 
Residual 162083.176 6010 26.969   
1 
Total 185682.241 6012    
a. Predictors: (Constant), cinc, rgdpch 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.563 .091  28.249 .000
rgdpch -5.899E-5 .000 -.082 -6.736 .000
1 
cinc 91.513 3.109 .358 29.432 .000
a. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
Table 5.   Regression of (P.1), Controlling for (cinc).  
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Analysis of Table 5 shows that the variances in the 
dependent variable (hostscore), while controlling for 
(cinc) states, can be explained by variances in the 
independent variable, (rgdpch), nearly thirteen percent of 
the time.  Though the standard error is 5.19 percent, the 
R-square and adjusted R-square are .127, which shows that 
the linear relationship between the two variables is 
statistically insignificant.  Examining the ANOVA, we find 
that the F of 437.523 is significant at .000, which is less 
than the alpha of .05.  From this, the ANOVA shows that 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of change in 
(hostscore).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables, in 
that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 
5.89 units of change in (hostscore).  This is also 
statistically significant due to the p-value being below 
alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch), when 
controlling for (cinc) states, has a statistically 
insignificant linear relationship with (hostscore).  Even 
though the R-square is not significant, (rgdpch) is a 
significant predictor of variance in (hostscore) and that 
for every unit of change in (rgdpch) there is nearly six 
times the change in (hostscore).  From these results, we 
determine that (P.1) is proved true in that high levels of 
domestic trade, when controlled for (cinc), will lower a 













1 tpop, rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .284a .081 .081 5.329
a. Predictors: (Constant), tpop, rgdpch 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 15025.385 2 7512.693 264.574 .000a 
Residual 170656.856 6010 28.395   
1 
Total 185682.241 6012    
a. Predictors: (Constant), tpop, rgdpch 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.411 .095  25.372 .000
rgdpch -1.359E-5 .000 -.019 -1.522 .128
1 
tpop 1.436E-5 .000 .283 22.820 .000
a. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
Table 6.   Regression of (P.1), Controlling for (tpot). 
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Analysis of Table 6 shows that the variances in the 
dependent variable (hostscore), while controlling for 
(tpop) states, can be explained by variances in the 
independent variable, (rgdpch), nearly thirteen percent of 
the time.  Though the standard error is 5.32 percent, the 
R-square and adjusted R-square are .081, which shows that 
the linear relationship between the two variables is 
statistically insignificant.  Examining the ANOVA, we find 
that the F of 264.576 is significant at .000, which is less 
than the alpha of .05.  From this, the ANOVA shows that 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of change in 
(hostscore).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables, in 
that for every unit of change in (rgdpch) there will be 
1.36 units of change in (hostscore).  This is not 
statistically significant due to the p-value of .128 being 
above alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that 
(rgdpch), when controlling for (tpop) states, has a 
statistically insignificant linear relationship with 
(hostscore).  Even though the R-square is not significant, 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of variance in 
(hostscore) and that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), 
there is nearly two times the change in (hostscore). 
However, the predicted value change in (hostscore) is not 
statistically significant.  The above results are 
inconclusive in that there is no linear relationship. The 
ANOVA shows that (rgdpch), when controlled for (tpop), is a 
significant predictor of variance in (hostscore), but that 
this variance is insignificant. 
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region =  1 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .215a .046 .045 5.020 




region =  2 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .140a .020 .019 4.309 




region =  3 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .060a .004 .003 3.047 




region =  4 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .196a .038 .037 9.428 




region =  5 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .219a .048 .039 8.997 





region =  1 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 




region =  6 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .050a .002 .000 5.619 




region =  7 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .053a .003 .002 3.603 
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
Table 7.   Regression of (P.1), Controlling for (region). 
 
Analysis of table seven shows the linear relationship 
between the two variables when controlling for (region).  
By utilizing linear regression, we can conclude that 
(rgdpch) has an insignificant linear relationship with 
(hostscore).  While this test does not support (P.1), the 
results are consistent with the previous results in which 
all the tests produced a statistically insignificant linear 
relationship between the two variables.  As such, we 
conclude that there is a statistically insignificant linear 
relationship between domestic trade and inter-state 
disputes when controlling for region.     
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D. TESTING (P.2) HIGH LEVELS OF DOMESTIC TRADE WILL LOWER 
A STATE’S PROPENSITY TO FALL INTO CIVIL WAR 
Following the tests of (P.1), we will in like manner 
test the second proposition of the hypothesis, which argues 
that high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war. 







1 rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .128a .016 .016 .198
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 4.457 1 4.457 114.149 .000a 
Residual 269.704 6907 .039   
1 
Total 274.161 6908    
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .064 .003  20.132 .0001 








1 rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
a. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Table 8.   Regression of (P.2), No Control Variables. 
 
Table 8 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable, (civilwar), can be explained by variances in the 
independent variable, (rgdpch), 1.6 percent of the time.  
Though the standard error is small at .198 percent, the R-
square and adjusted R-square are .016, which shows that the 
linear relationship between the two variables is 
statistically insignificant.  Examining the ANOVA, we find 
that the F of 114.149 is significant at .000, which is less 
than the alpha of .05.  From this, the ANOVA shows that 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of change in 
(civilwar).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables, in 
that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 
3.20 units of change in (hostscore). This is also 
statistically significant due to the p-value being below 
alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch) has a 
statistically insignificant linear relationship with 
(civilwar).  Even though the R-square is not significant, 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of variance in 
(civilwar) and that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), 
there is more than three times the change in (civilwar).  
From these results, we determine that (P.2) is proved true 
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in that high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war. 
 
 
Figure 2.   (rgdpch) vs. (civilwar) Scatter Plot. 
 
Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the linear 
regression test conducted between (rgdpch) and (civilwar). 
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1 rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 




liberal =  1 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .131a .017 .017 .144
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
ANOVAb,c 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression .845 1 .845 40.538 .000a 
Residual 48.073 2307 .021   
1 
Total 48.917 2308    
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .048 .005  9.372 .0001 
rgdpch -2.748E-6 .000 -.131 -6.367 .000
a. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
b. Selecting only cases for which liberal =  1 
Table 9.   Regression of (P.2), with (liberal) States. 
 
Table 9 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable (civilwar), when controlling for (liberal) states, 
can be explained by variances in the independent variable 
(rgdpch), 1.7 percent of the time.  Though the standard 
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error is small at .144 percent, the R-square and adjusted 
R-square are .017, which shows that the linear relationship 
between the two variables is statistically insignificant.  
Examining the ANOVA, we find that the F of 40.538 is 
significant at .000, which is less than the alpha of .05.  
From this, the ANOVA shows that (rgdpch), when controlled 
for (liberal) states, is a significant predictor of change 
in (civilwar).  The coefficients for the test show that 
there is an inverse relationship between the two variables, 
in that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 
2.74 units of change in (civilwar).  This is also 
statistically significant due to the p-value being below 
alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch) has a 
statistically insignificant linear relationship with 
(civilwar).  Even though the R-square is not significant, 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of variance in 
(civilwar) and that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), 
there is nearly three times the change in (civilwar).  From 
these results, we determine that (P.2) is proved true in 
that high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war.  Additionally, when 
controlling for (liberal) states, changes in (rgdpch) will 
have a lesser effect on (civilwar) than no changes in 
(rgdpch).   
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1 rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 




liberal =  0 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .112a .013 .012 .248
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
ANOVAb,c 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 2.754 1 2.754 44.873 .000a 
Residual 216.611 3530 .061   
1 
Total 219.364 3531    
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .085 .005  17.016 .0001 
rgdpch -3.731E-6 .000 -.112 -6.699 .000
a. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
b. Selecting only cases for which liberal =  0 
Table 10.   Regression of (P.2), with Non-(liberal) States. 
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Table 10 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable (civilwar), when controlling for Non-(liberal) 
states, can be explained by variances in the independent 
variable, (rgdpch), 1.3 percent of the time.  The standard 
error is .248 percent, the R-square is .013 and the 
adjusted R-square is .012, which shows that the linear 
relationship between the two variables is statistically 
insignificant.  Examining the ANOVA, we find that the F of 
44.873 is significant at .000, which is less than the alpha 
of .05.  From this, the ANOVA shows that (rgdpch), when 
controlled for Non-(liberal) states, is a significant 
predictor of change in (civilwar).  The coefficients for 
the test show that there is an inverse relationship between 
the two variables, in that for every unit of change in 
(rgdpch) there will be 3.731 units of change in (civilwar).  
This is also statistically significant due to the p-value 
being below alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that 
(rgdpch) has a statistically insignificant linear 
relationship with (civilwar).  Even though the R-square is 
not significant, (rgdpch) is a significant predictor of 
variance in (civilwar) and that for every unit of change in 
(rgdpch), there is nearly four times the change in 
(civilwar).  From these results, we determine that (P.2) is 
proved true in that high levels of domestic trade will 
lower a state’s propensity to fall into civil war.  
Additionally, when controlling for Non-(liberal) states, 
changes in (rgdpch) will have a greater effect on 
(civilwar) than no changes in (rgdpch), which is similar to 
the results of the same test on (P.1).   
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1 cinc, rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .139a .019 .019 .210
a. Predictors: (Constant), cinc, rgdpch 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 5.213 2 2.607 58.832 .000a 
Residual 266.279 6010 .044   
1 
Total 271.492 6012    
a. Predictors: (Constant), cinc, rgdpch 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .074 .004  20.006 .000
rgdpch -3.829E-6 .000 -.139 -10.786 .000
1 
cinc .031 .126 .003 .250 .803
a. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Table 11.   Regression of (P.2), Controlling for (cinc). 
 
Table 11 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable, (civilwar), when controlling for (cinc), can be 
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explained by variances in the independent variable, 
(rgdpch), 1.9 percent of the time.  The standard error is 
.210 percent and the R-square and adjusted R-square are 
both .019, which shows that the linear relationship between 
the two variables is statistically insignificant.  
Examining the ANOVA, we find that the F of 58.832 is 
significant at .000, which is less than the alpha of .05.  
From this, the ANOVA shows that (rgdpch), when controlled 
for (cinc) states, is a significant predictor of change in 
(civilwar).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables, in 
that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 
3.829 units of change in (civilwar).  This is also 
statistically significant due to the p-value being below 
alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch) has a 
statistically insignificant linear relationship with 
(civilwar).  Even though the R-square is not significant, 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of variance in 
(civilwar) and that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), 
there is nearly four times the change in (civilwar).  From 
these results, we determine that (P.2) is proved true in 
that high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war.  Additionally, when 
controlling for (cinc) states, changes in (rgdpch) will 
have a greater effect on (civilwar) than no changes in 
(rgdpch), which is different from the test results on 











1 tpop, rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .139a .019 .019 .210
a. Predictors: (Constant), tpop, rgdpch 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 5.211 2 2.606 58.810 .000a 
Residual 266.280 6010 .044   
1 
Total 271.492 6012    
a. Predictors: (Constant), tpop, rgdpch 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .074 .004  19.666 .000
rgdpch -3.820E-6 .000 -.139 -10.833 .000
1 
tpop -3.422E-9 .000 -.002 -.138 .890
a. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Table 12.   Regression of (P.2), Controlling for (tpop). 
 
Table 12 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable, (civilwar), when controlling for (tpop), can be 
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explained by variances in the independent variable, 
(rgdpch), 1.9 percent of the time.  The standard error is 
.210 percent and the R-square and adjusted R-square are 
both .019, which shows that the linear relationship between 
the two variables is statistically insignificant.  
Examining the ANOVA, we find that the F of 58.810 is 
significant at .000, which is less than the alpha of .05.  
From this, the ANOVA shows that (rgdpch), when controlled 
for (tpop) states, is a significant predictor of change in 
(civilwar).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables, in 
that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 
3.820 units of change in (civilwar).  This is also 
statistically significant due to the p-value being below 
alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch) has a 
statistically insignificant linear relationship with 
(civilwar).  Even though the R-square is not significant, 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of variance in 
(civilwar) and that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), 
there is nearly four times the change in (civilwar).  From 
these results, we determine that (P.2) is proved true in 
that high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war.  Additionally, when 
controlling for (tpop) states, changes in (rgdpch) will 
have a greater effect on (civilwar) than no changes in 









region =  1 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .148a .022 .021 .223 




region =  2 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .125a .016 .015 .103 




region =  3 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .117a .014 .013 .201 




region =  4 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .102a .010 .009 .155 




region =  6 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .146a .021 .019 .267 





region =  1 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 





region =  7 
(Selected) R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .109a .012 .011 .238 
a. Predictors: (Constant), rgdpch 
Table 13.   Regression of (P.2), Controlling for (region). 
 
Analysis of Table 13 shows the linear relationship 
between the two variables when controlling for (region).  
By utilizing linear regression, we can conclude that 
(rgdpch) has an insignificant linear relationship with 
(civilwar).  While this test does not support (P.2), the 
results are consistent with the previous results in which 
all the tests produced a statistically insignificant linear 
















1 milex, rgdpcha . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .140a .020 .019 .210
a. Predictors: (Constant), milex, rgdpch 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 5.318 2 2.659 60.039 .000a 
Residual 266.174 6010 .044   
1 
Total 271.492 6012    
a. Predictors: (Constant), milex, rgdpch 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .074 .004  20.299 .000
rgdpch -3.962E-6 .000 -.144 -10.886 .000
1 
milex 2.471E-10 .000 .021 1.559 .119
a. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Table 14.   Regression of (P.2), Controlling for (milex). 
 
Table 14 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable, (civilwar), when controlling for (milex), can be 
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explained by variances in the independent variable, 
(rgdpch), 2 percent of the time.  The standard error is 
.210 percent, the R-square is .020, and the adjusted R-
square is .019, which shows that the linear relationship 
between the two variables is statistically insignificant.  
Examining the ANOVA, we find that the F of 60.039 is 
significant at .000, which is less than the alpha of .05.  
From this, the ANOVA shows that (rgdpch), when controlled 
for (milex) states, is a significant predictor of change in 
(civilwar).  The coefficients for the test show that there 
is an inverse relationship between the two variables, in 
that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), there will be 
3.96 units of change in (civilwar).  This is also 
statistically significant due to the p-value being below 
alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that (rgdpch) has a 
statistically insignificant linear relationship with 
(civilwar).  Even though the R-square is not significant, 
(rgdpch) is a significant predictor of variance in 
(civilwar) and that for every unit of change in (rgdpch), 
there is nearly four times the change in (civilwar).  From 
these results, we determine that (P.2) is proved true in 
that high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war.  Additionally, when 
controlling for (milex) states, changes in (rgdpch) will 
have a greater effect on (civilwar) than no changes in 
(rgdpch).   
E. TESTING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN (LIBERAL), (HOSTSCORE) 
AND (CIVILWAR) 
Following the tests of (P.1) and (P.2), additional 
tests, as shown below, were designed to measure the linear 
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relationship between (liberal), (hostscore) and (civilwar) 
in order to determine the relationship between liberal 
governments, inter-state violence, and civil war. 







1 liberala . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .006a .000 .000 5.602
a. Predictors: (Constant), liberal 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 7.652 1 7.652 .244 .621a 
Residual 207203.631 6602 31.385   
1 
Total 207211.283 6603    
a. Predictors: (Constant), liberal 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.879 .086  33.464 .0001 
liberal -.071 .144 -.006 -.494 .621
a. Dependent Variable: hostscore 
Table 15.   Regression of (liberal) and (hostscore). 
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Table 15 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable, (hostscore), can be explained by variances in the 
independent variable, (liberal), 0.0 percent of the time.  
The standard error is 5.60 percent and the R-square and 
adjusted R-square are both .000, which shows that the 
linear relationship between the two variables is 
statistically insignificant.  Examining the ANOVA, we find 
an F of .244, which is insignificant and a Sig. of .621, 
which is more than the alpha of .05.  From this, the ANOVA 
shows that (liberal) is an insignificant predictor of 
change in (hostscore).  The coefficients for the test show 
that there is an inverse relationship between the two 
variables, in that for every unit of change in (liberal), 
there will be .071 units of change in (hostscore).  This is 
also statistically insignificant due to the p-value being 
above alpha.  From this test, we can conclude that 
(liberal) has a statistically insignificant linear 
relationship with (civilwar).  Additionally, (liberal) is 
an insignificant predictor of variance in (hostscore) and 
that for every unit of change in (liberal), there is less 
than one unit of change in (hostscore).  From these 
results, we determine that (liberal) states are just as 
likely as Non-(liberal) states to initiate inter-state 
conflict. 
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1 liberala . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .101a .010 .010 .221
a. Predictors: (Constant), liberal 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 3.339 1 3.339 68.296 .000a 
Residual 322.742 6602 .049   
1 
Total 326.081 6603    
a. Predictors: (Constant), liberal 





Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .069 .003  20.284 .0001 
liberal -.047 .006 -.101 -8.264 .000
a. Dependent Variable: civilwar 
Table 16.   Regression of (liberal) and (civilwar). 
 
Table 16 shows that the variances in the dependent 
variable (civilwar), can be explained by variances in the 
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independent variable, (liberal), 1 percent of the time.  
With a small standard error of .22 percent, the R-square 
and adjusted R-square are .01, which shows that the linear 
relationship between the two variables is statistically 
insignificant.  Examining the ANOVA, we find an F of 68.29 
and a significance of .00, which is less than the alpha of 
.05.  From this, the ANOVA shows that (liberal) is a 
significant predictor of change in (civilwar).  The 
coefficients for the test show that there is an inverse 
relationship between the two variables, in that for every 
unit of change in (liberal), there will be .047 units of 
change in (civilwar).  While the p-value is below alpha, 
the variance of less than 1 unit is statistically 
insignificant.  From this test, we can conclude that 
(liberal) has a statistically insignificant linear 
relationship with (civilwar).  Additionally, (liberal) is a 
significant predictor of variance in (civilwar), but that 
for every unit of change in (liberal), there is less than 
one unit of change in (civilwar).  From these results, we 
determine that (liberal) states are less likely, when 
compared to Non-(liberal) states, to experience civil war. 
F. SUMMARY 
Utilizing the methodology specified in Chapter III, 
this chapter tested the two propositions that comprise the 
overarching thesis.  Specifically, we tested each of the 
two propositions, and in doing so tested each of the 
propositions utilizing linear regression to determine the 
correlation between the independent and dependent 
variables. In addition, by using the aforesaid control 
variables, we controlled for or isolated certain 
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characteristics that may influence the overall results of 
the tests.  We also ran tests on the effect of the 
variable, (liberal), on the dependent variables (hostscore) 
and (civilwar).        
1. (P.1) High Levels of Domestic Trade Will Lower a 
State’s Propensity to Initiate Inter-State 
Conflict 
The analyses of the first proposition all showed that 
there is a statistically insignificant linear relationship 
between the independent variable, (rgdpch), and dependent 
variable, (hostscore).  The only exceptions to this 
occurred when controlling for (cinc) and (tpop) where the 
linear relationship was 12.7 and 8.1 percent respectively.  
This finding is not surprising considering that (cinc) is a 
measure of a state’s national military capabilities and 
that (tpop) is a subcomponent of (cinc).  The conclusion is 
that when a state increases its national military 
capabilities, it tends to initiate inter-state conflict, 
which is further supported by the 36.3 and 29.1 percent 
correlation between (cinc) and (tpop), and (cinc) and 
(hostscore) respectively.   
Even though there is generally no significant linear 
relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables, the results of our tests show that (rgdpch) can 
reliably predict variances in (hostscore).  Moreover, in 
every case of testing, changes in the independent variable 
will result in a negative change in the dependent variable.  
That is, as the number of (rgdpch) units increases, the 
number of (hostscore) units will decrease, with the 
exception of the times when controlling for (liberal) 
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states.  In this test, when we isolated only (liberal) 
states, an increase of one unit of (rgdpch) resulted in an 
increase of 3.42 units of (hostscore).  While this result 
was unexpected, it shows that as states with “liberal” 
governments increase their (rgdpch), they will be more 
likely to initiate inter-state conflict. This is in keeping 
with the findings of Quackenbush and Rudy.76 
Based on the test results, we conclude that while 
there is no significant linear relationship between 
(rgdpch) and (hostscore), there is a statistically 
significant negative correlation of -.36, which is 
confirmed by significant ANOVA and coefficient values.  As 
such, (P.1) is accepted and we conclude that high levels of 
domestic trade will lower a state’s propensity to initiate 
inter-state conflict, with the exception of (liberal) 
states where high levels of domestic trade will increase a 
state’s propensity to initiate inter-state conflict.                     
2. (P.2) High levels of Domestic Trade Will Lower a 
State’s Propensity to Fall into Civil War 
The analyses on the second proposition all show that 
there is a statistically insignificant linear relationship 
between the independent variable (rgdpch) and dependent 
variable (civilwar).     
Even though there is generally no significant linear 
relationship between the independent and dependent 
                     
76. Stephen L. Quackenbush, and Michael Rudy, “Evaluating The 
Monadic Democratic Peace,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (April 20-23, 
2006). 
http://www.missouri.edu/~polswww/papers/monadic%20democratic%20peace_MP
SA_.pdf (accessed April 30, 2009).  
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variables, the results of our tests show that (rgdpch) can 
reliably predict variances in (civilwar).  Moreover, in 
every test, changes in the independent variable resulted in 
a negative change in the dependent variable.  That is, as 
the number of (rgdpch) units increase, the number of 
(civilwar) units will decrease.  The results also show that 
variable, (liberal), is negatively correlated with 
(civilwar) at -.101, which is keeping with recent 
scholarship that shows that states with liberal governments 
are less likely to abuse the rights of their citizens or 
fall into civil war.77  
From the results of the above testing, we conclude 
that while there is no significant linear relationship 
between (rgdpch) and (civilwar), there is a statistically 
significant negative correlation of -.128, which is 
confirmed by significant ANOVA and coefficient values.  As 
such, (P.2) is accepted and we conclude that high levels of 
domestic trade will lower a state’s propensity to fall into 
civil war.                         
G. CONCLUSION 
The results of the above testing do show that (rgdpch) 
is negatively correlated to (hostscore) and (civilwar), but 
that there is no statistically significant linear 
                     
77 For more on the effect of liberal governments on domestic 
violence, see: Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Niles 
Gleditsch, "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace?  Democracy, Political 
Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992," American Political Science Review, 
no. 95 (2001): 33-48, Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned From The 
Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 
1955,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), and 
Christian Davenport and David A Armstrong II, “Democracy and The 
Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis From 1976 to 1996,” 
American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 3 (2004).    
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relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables.  Because of the lack of significant findings 
when considering the linear relationship between the 
variables, we must consider possible reasons for this 
result.  The first possible reason is that the overarching 
thesis and supporting propositions are wrong and that 
domestic trade does not have a significant linear 
relationship with the dependent variables.  The second 
possible reason is that the data sets might have contained 
errors or did not accurately measure the independent, 
dependent, and control variables.  The third possibility is 
that the variables were not accurately operationalized and 
thus, the data sets selected for the testing were not 
measuring what they should have been measuring.  Lastly, 
the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables might be something other than linear and as such, 
not accounted for in our testing. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis examined how different levels of domestic 
trade affect the intensity of conflict within and between 
states.  Specifically, the thesis examined whether domestic 
trade is systematically related to conflict, both 
international and domestic.  Many scholars accept the 
thesis of democratic peace and international trade. Much 
scholarship has been presented examining the relationship 
between the levels of international trade, and in 
particular bilateral trade, and militarized inter-state 
conflict.  This thesis tried to expand our understanding of 
inter and intra-state conflict by focusing on domestic 
trade, a factor that has heretofore not been thoroughly 
examined. 
Much of the foreign policy of the United States is 
based on the theory that the integration of economies into 
a global community will increase the level of 
interdependence. This, in turn, will lower the number and 
intensity of global militarized intra-state disputes and 
inter-state war.  It is believed that this interdependence 
will create a secure global environment for the United 
States and its allies.78  Much literature has been written 
on the effects of trade on conflict, and even the 
                     
78 Office of the President of the United States, The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 25-30 and 47-9. 
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democratizing effects of trade.79 However, in the case of 
states where democracy is expected to grow or at least 
where are states are expected to become open economies that 
participate in free and fair trade, it is important to 
examine the role of domestic trade.80  Since the majority of 
the literature addresses either the trade-conflict debate 
or the relationship between civil war and international 
trade, this thesis tried to broaden our inquiry by 
examining the relationship between domestic trade and 
conflict, both international and internal.  The point of 
departure for this analysis is the theory that domestic 
trade is intimately related to economic development within 
a state, which helps to increase political stability.81  
Building on these theories, we assumed that the pacifying 
benefits of economic development are not limited to  
 
 
                     
79 See: John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Moaz and Bruce 
Russett, "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and 
International Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 
1996), John R. Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Test of the Democratic 
Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85," Political 
Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce 
M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies 
Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 1997), John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, 
"Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade 
Still Reduces Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 
1999), and Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal and David R. Davis, "The Third 
Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and 
Militarized Disputes, 1950-85," International Organization 52, no. 3 
(Summer 1998). 
80 Office of the President of the United States, The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006): 25-6. 
81 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political 
Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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internal disputes and that improved domestic trade can 
reduce the number and intensity of militarized conflicts 
within and between states. 
For our analysis, the thesis hypothesized that 
domestic trade and conflict is negatively correlated and 
made the following propositions that were tested, analyzed, 
and accepted in the course of our analysis.  
Propositions 
(P.1) High levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to initiate inter-state conflict. 
(P.2) High levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war. 
From the results of testing (P.1), we conclude that 
there is no significant linear relationship between 
(rgdpch) and (hostscore), but there is a statistically 
significant negative correlation of -.36, which is 
confirmed by significant ANOVA and coefficient values.  As 
such, high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to initiate inter-state conflict, with the 
exception of (liberal) states where high levels of domestic 
trade will increase a state’s tendency to initiate inter-
state conflict.   
In addition, the results of testing (P.2) show that 
there is no significant linear relationship between 
(rgdpch) and (civilwar), but there is a statistically 
significant negative correlation of -.128, which is 
confirmed by significant ANOVA and coefficient values.  As 
such, high levels of domestic trade will lower a state’s 
propensity to fall into civil war.   
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B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results of our analysis imply that the adoption of 
certain polices which result in effects that are in line 
with our findings will decrease the amount of inter-state 
disputes and civil war.  As such, after considering the 
results of testing (P.1) and (P.2), we can infer certain 
policy implications that are discussed below. 
The liberal international relations theory of 
democratic peace suggests that states with democratic forms 
of government will never go to war.  This theory is 
obviously attractive, because if valid, then democracy is 
central for ending international violence.  The implication 
of this conclusion is obvious. Supporting the spread of 
democracy throughout the world will create the conditions 
for perpetual peace, a result with which no one can argue.82  
While very attractive, some critique the theory as a myth, 
citing numerous cases when states with democratic 
governments engaged in conflict. In addition, they argue 
that the data used to formulate the theory is insignificant 
because the number of democratic governments is small and 
relatively modern.83  The findings of our research imply 
                     
82  For more on the democratic peace theory, see: Dean V. Babst, , 
“A Force for Peace,” Industrial Research (1972), Melvin Small and David 
J. Singer, “The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965,” 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, no. 1 (1976), Zeev Maoz 
and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-
1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (1989), Stuart A. Bremer, , 
“Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965,” 
International Interactions, no. 18 (1993), and Zeev Maoz and Bruce 
Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-
1986,” American Political Science Review, no. 87 (1993).     
83 See: Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of The Democratic 
Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994), and Thomas Schwartz, 
and Kiron K. Skinner, “The Myth of The Democratic Peace,” Obris 46, no. 
1 (2002). 
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that this latter group of scholars are correct and that the 
theory of democratic peace does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the propensity of a state to initiate 
an inter-state dispute.  Specifically, states considered to 
have liberal governments had a lower incidence of 
initiating inter-state disputes .006 percent of the time.  
Moreover, states with liberal governments were 10 percent 
less likely to fall into civil war, which while 
significant, explains less variance than the variable 
domestic trade. 
Comparing the above results to the relationship of 
domestic trade with inter-state violence, we found that 
domestic trade could reduce the incidence of initiating 
inter-state violence 3.6 percent of the time. This is a 
weak, but statistically significant relationship.  
Moreover, domestic trade decreases the propensity of a 
state to fall into civil war 12.8 percent of the time.  In 
the cases of inter-state disputes and civil war, increasing 
domestic trade lowers a state’s propensity to initiate an 
inter-state dispute or fall into civil war more than 
promoting the spread of democracy.   
The policy implication of the above is obvious.  
Having a goal of eliminating or decreasing the level of 
inter-state disputes and civil war in order to ensure our 
national security would not involve spreading democracy, 
but rather would involve increasing the level of domestic 
trade within states.  This is not to say that our findings 
discount the pacifying effects of democracy, but rather, 
that increasing levels of domestic trade have a greater 
impact on the propensity to initiate inter-state disputes 
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or to fall into civil war.  Implementing policy with the 
goal of advancing domestic trade would have the greatest 
statistical effect on inter-state disputes and civil war.      
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
We will be the first to admit that this study only 
scratched the surface of examining the relationship between 
domestic trade and inter-state disputes and civil war. 
However, from our research, we can recommend certain areas 
for future study.  Building on the conclusion of Chapter 
IV, our study should be repeated using different data sets 
to measure the variables.  Moreover, because we might have 
incorrectly operationalized the variables, a careful 
analysis might indeed show them to be incorrect and further 
research many find more accurate ways to measure the 
variables.  Lastly, because we conclude that there is no 
significant linear relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, additional testing should be run 
utilizing different regression models. 
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APPENDIX: DATA SET CODE BOOK 
The following describes the particulars for each of 
the variables and variable components used in this study.   
country:  Country Name 
Year:  Data Year 
rgdpch84: Real GDP in constant 2000 United States 
dollars (does not include net exports) 
kc:   Consumption Share of rgdpch 
kg:   Government Share of rgdpch 
ki:   Investment Share of rgdpch 
region85:  1=East Asia and Pacific 
2=Europe and Central Asia 
3=Latin America and Caribbean 




liberal86:  1=Liberal Government 
   0=Other 
                     
84  For rgdpch, kc, kg, and ki see: Robert Summers and Alan Heston, 
"The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International 
Comparisons, 1950-1988," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 2 
(May 1991). 




(accessed May 01, 2009).  In addition, see: Douglas M. Stinnett, 
Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman, "The 
Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3," Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, 2, 19 (2002): 58-66. 
86 Michael Doyle, "Ideologies and Politics: Liberal Democracy and 
National Dictatorship in Peace and War," in War and Peace in the 20th 
Century and Beyond, ed. Geir Lundestad and Olav Njolstad (Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2002): 60. 
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stateabb:  State Abbreviation 
irst87: Iron and steel production (thousands of 
tons) 
milex: Military expenditures (in constant 2001 
United States dollars) 
milper:  Military personnel (thousands) 
energy: Energy consumption (thousands of coal-ton 
equivalents) 
tpop:  Total population (thousands) 
upop: Urban population (population living in 
cities with a population greater than 
100,000) 
cinc: Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC) 
  
hiact88:  Highest action of dispute 
 
   0 No militarized action [1] 
1 Threat to use force [2] 
2 Threat to blockade [2] 
3 Threat to occupy territory [2] 
4 Threat to declare war [2] 
5 Threat to use CBR weapons [2] 
6 Threat to join war 
7 Show of force [3] 
8 Alert [3] 
9 Nuclear alert [3] 
10 Mobilization [3] 
                     
87 For irst, milex, milper, energy, tpop, upop, and cinc see: David 
J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability, Distribution, 
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Peace, War, and 
Numbers, ed. Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972). 
88 For hiact and maxhost see: Faten Ghosn, Geln Plamer, and Stuart 
Bremer, "The MID3 Dataset, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and 
Description," Conflict Management and Peace Science, no. 21 (2004): 
133-154. 
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11 Fortify border [3] 
12 Border violation [3] 
13 Blockade [4] 
14 Occupation of territory [4] 
15 Seizure [4] 
16 Attack [4] 
17 Clash [4] 
18 Declaration of war [4] 
19 Use of CBR weapons [4] 
20 Begin inter-state war [5] 
21 Join inter-state war [5] 
-9 Missing [-9] 
maxhost: Above bracketed numbers refer to 
corresponding hostility level 
 
sumhost:  Sum of all hostility levels 
 
count:  Number of hiact incidents directed to other  
states 
 
hostscore: Sum of sumhost and maxhost 
 
civilwar89: 0=No civil war 
   1=civil war 
 
The propositions that were tested: 
(P.1) High levels of domestic trade will lower a 
state’s propensity to initiate a militarized inter-state 
dispute. 
In testing P.1, we compared the relationship between 
the independent variable (domestic trade) and the dependent 
                     
89 Meredith Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 
1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18, 1 (2000): 123-144. 
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variable (the COW MID data set).  We also utilized the 
control variables (regime type, region, and military 
capability ratio) to include the subcomponent population.  
We built a one-year lag into our testing in order for 
changes in the independent variable to be seen in the 
dependent variable.  In testing this proposition, we 
expected that the independent variable would decrease prior 
to an increase in conflict intensity in the dependent 
variable. 
Independent variable = rgdpch 
Dependent Variable = hostscore 
Control Variables = liberal, region, cinc, tpop  
(P.2) High levels of domestic trade will lower a 
state’s propensity to fall into civil war. 
In testing P.2, we compared the relationship between 
the independent variable (domestic trade) and the dependent 
variable (the COW Intra-State War v3.0 data set).  We also 
utilized the control variables (regime type, region, and 
military capability ratio) to include the subcomponent 
population and military expenditures.  As said above, we 
built a one-year lag into our testing in order for changes 
in the independent variable to be seen in the dependent 
variable.  In testing this proposition, we expected that 
the independent variable would decrease prior to the 
initiation of rebellion or civil war in the dependent 
variable. 
 Independent Variable = rgdpch 
 Dependent Variable = civilwar 
 Control Variables = liberal, region, cinc, tpop, milex 
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